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SummaRY
the main goal of the management of public funds and public assets is to promote social 
well-being. in order to realise the main goals and 
to evaluate individual measures, it is indispen-
sable to sub-categorise the primary objective, 
determine the hierarchy of objectives, assign 
measurable criteria to the objectives, evaluate 
performance and provide feedback. by perform-
ing objective, professionally sound evaluations 
and providing feedback, independent audits 
contribute significantly to the improvement of 
performance. a basic requirement of all audits, 
however, is the auditability of the objectives’ 
implementation and effectiveness and the defi-
nition of performance criteria for each objec-
tive. a large part of the proven methods and 
tools used in the for-profit sector for perform-
ance assessment can be applied successfully at 
organisations of the public sector as well, if the 
specialties are treated appropriately.
ideally, legal regulations serve to specify 
expectations regarding the strategically control-
led, result-oriented and efficient operation of or-
ganisations using public funds. When such ex-
pectations are enshrined in legislation, it means 
that the expectation is high-level, binding and 
enforceable. in this regard, hungarian regula-
tions are still insufficient in many cases; in other 
areas, however, some positive developments are 
in progress which are expected to improve the 
quality of public spending.
the audit findings of the state audit office 
of hungary (sao) confirm that the management 
and control systems of both public entities and 
state-owned enterprises need to be improved 
significantly in order to ensure good govern-
ance and public sector management. indicators 
that capture and adequately measure the effec-
tiveness and efficiency of public spending are 
important prerequisite for the efficient manage-
ment of public funds and for the planning pro-
cess. 
this is also a precondition for the sao’s 
ability to demonstrate the utilisation of public 
funds in a measurable and comparable manner, 
thereby contributing to the improvement of the 
efficiency of public sector management.
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1. IntRODuctIOn 
the management of the diverse and complex economic, social and environmental problems 
of our time presents a serious challenge for public 
management and governance. Programmes and pub-
lic services with high financing requirement must be 
implemented and provided from a limited amount of 
public funds, while there is also a need to meet the 
expectations of an information-intensive, competi-
tion-oriented society.
mainly as a result of economic and financial 
crises, the state appeared as a market participant in 
several segments, increasing its participation, among 
others, in the banking sector and the energy serv-
ice market (see for example, Turcsányi, 2008, or 
Domokos, 2015). in these areas, both sectoral govern-
ance and organisation management are determined by 
different aspects than those seen at budgetary institu-
tions. companies have to be managed under market 
conditions, in a continuously changing environment, 
with revenue and profit targets in mind. as a result, 
the management of state-owned companies is often 
forced to rely on the same management techniques as 
those applied by other market participants. 
although public entities do not operate under 
market conditions and typically enjoy monopolistic 
positions, they are linked to the private sector in sev-
eral regards (purchases, recruitment, certain services, 
e.g. deliveries). the hierarchy of objectives and the 
operational frameworks are fundamentally defined 
by legislation. consequently, the organisation is far 
less flexible than a business association, and it is at 
the discretion of the manager1 to fill these frame-
works with substance. in addition, the manager of 
a public sector organisation needs to consider rapid 
shifts in the environment that pose numerous chal-
lenges, as regulatory changes tend to follow them 
with a lag or sometimes belatedly. accordingly, 
public sector managers are increasingly expected 
to have innovation skills and an ability to promote 
risk management and organisational learning, and 
as such, their role goes far beyond a passive type of 
organisational management focusing solely on regu-
latory compliance.
it is clear, therefore, that governing a public entity 
and managing a state-owned company both require 
adequate managerial skills. the definition of the en-
tire objective hierarchy, the optimisation of organi-
sational processes, performance-oriented, responsive 
and flexible operations, high-quality services and the 
improvement of employee performance constitute 
the backbone of management expectations. in addi-
tion, with respect to public spending, management 
is required to meet the expectations of all stakehold-
ers, i.e. households using the public services, market 
participants, civil society, etc. in our information so-
ciety, the ability to monitor governance, the transpar-
ency of management and the participation are basic 
needs. this calls for a new approach on the part of 
public sector managers. the principles of ‘good gov-
ernance’ reflect this new approach.
the basis of good governance is the thoroughly 
planned, effective, efficient and responsible man-
agement of public funds. by controlling this proc-
ess, state audit offices provide objective assessment 
and feedback on the performance of public spend-
ing. after the presentation of the theoretical back-
ground related to these qualitative aspects of good 
governance, this paper explores the subject based on 
the experiences of the state audit office. the paper 
provides a number of examples to demonstrate what 
happens when the objectives of public spending are 
not defined adequately, or when no outcome criteria 
have been assigned to the pre-defined objectives. it 
shows the implications of a failure to collect data, 
which leads to a failure to monitor and measure the 
implementation of the objectives, and thus the use of 
public funds is either not expedient or it is impossible 
to determine whether it is expedient and effective. in 
the course of its performance audits, in many cases 
the sao itself defined indicators in order to ensure 
its ability to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of 
public spending. this, however, raises several prob-
lems to be discussed later in the study.
1  Certainly, the frameworks imply different things at different management levels; moreover, even subordinate public sector employees have a degree 
of independence, and hence, responsibility. 
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2. QuEStIOnS RElatED 
tO tHE EffEctIvEnESS 
Of gOvernAnce 
2.1 How does effectiveness 
relate to good governance? 
Nowadays, good governance is expected to strive for the reform of public administra-
tion and the enforcement of modern manage-
ment and institution-organisational aspects (Pu-
lay, 2014). Policy-makers and decision-makers 
often meet these expectations in consideration 
of the corporate governance principles and prac-
tices applied in the for-profit sector, even though 
the two sectors show significant differences. 
the hierarchy of objectives is wider and more 
sophisticated in the case of public spending, and 
social expectations necessitate tighter ethical 
requirements. if so, how can a management ap-
proach tailored to profit-oriented organisations 
gain ground in the non-profit sector? for what 
purpose and to what extent can the public sector 
adopt these management techniques?
since the 1980s, public sector management 
in developed countries of the world had been 
subject to considerable changes. this can be 
attributed to the economic problems arising in 
the aftermath of the oil crisis on the one hand, 
and to shifts in the operating environment of 
governance on the other hand (Turcsányi, 2008). 
Establishing a cost-efficient state to reduce the 
burdens of economic participants became an 
increasingly important objective. the outbreak 
of the financial crisis in 2008 and the ensuing 
surge in public expenditure (as a percentage 
of GDP) pushed this objective back into the 
spotlight (Felméry, 2014). in addition, the con-
tinuous improvement in the quality of market 
services raised the expectations set for public 
services, which also motivated the public sector 
to improve effectiveness and efficiency (Hajnal, 
2004). the information technology boom and 
the development of the internet also called for 
the application of modern technologies which, 
in turn, gave rise to a dramatic development in 
management information systems and thus im-
proved the transparency of the operation of the 
public sector. all of this incited policy-makers to 
adopt novel approaches to the problems of gov-
ernance. Essentially, they were aimed at modi-
fying state participation, improving the effec-
tiveness, efficiency and economy of the public 
sector and enhancing the quality of public serv-
ices primarily by the adaptation of the manage-
ment philosophies and techniques applied in the 
private sector. 
the guiding principles of the new public ad-
ministration mainly reflected the impact of the 
New Public management (NPm) movement, but 
the new approach to public sector management 
also drew from the theories of neoliberalism2, 
Public choice3 and neo-taylorism4. according 
to hajnal (2004), the government and adminis-
trative reforms implemented in recent years en-
tailed the adoption and dissemination of NPm 
principles and methods (both among certain 
multilateral organisations such as the oEcD 
– Puma/PGc or siGma5, and the developed 
countries of the world, including hungary). an 
important component of the NPm is to establish 
a new culture for public administration and, in 
a broader sense, governance. this culture “is 
based on partnership and individual initiatives 
2  According to the neoliberal movement, since competition strengthens the economy, the state should be downsized, public services should be steered 
to the market and in general, the economic role of the for-profit sector should be increased.
3  In the bureaucracy theory of Public Choice, policy-makers and executive officials seek to maximise their personal utility, and the movement explores 
the implications of this choice.
4  Taylorism studies the topics of process management and performance improvement.
5  OECD PUMA (Public Management Committee) and subsequently, PGC (Public Governance Committee) were established to provide support to 
participating Member States in the planning, implementation and evaluation of public policies and public services.
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rather than (excessive) state power, effective-
ness/performance rather than regularity, co-
operation and flexibility rather than command 
and hierarchy and the values of (market) com-
petition rather than (state) monopoly” (hajnal, 
2004). the effect of the NPm was also perceiv-
able – and can still be perceived – in hungar-
ian administrative reform processes, such as the 
vertical breakdown of ministries (into a strate-
gic control centre – ministry – and a number of 
subordinate organisations), which was a typical 
structure until 2011–2012. other examples in-
clude the connection of the private sector into 
the public service systems (e.g. through PPP 
projects), the performance assessment of public 
service employees, the system of ex ante and ex 
post impact assessment and the application of 
quality assurance (e.g. iso).
subsequently, the adaptation of corporate 
management to the public sector in general, and 
the application and applicability of the NPm in 
particular, were subject to widespread criticism 
for several reasons. the areas challenged in-
cluded, for example, problems surrounding the 
output measurement of government activities, 
or the complexity and uncertainty of the issue 
of effectiveness and efficiency, in other words, 
what was to be considered the result of the ac-
tivity and whether the result achieved could be 
considered a good result. this notwithstanding, 
the main tenets of the movement dominate pub-
lic management to this day, and they are also 
reflected is some of the principles of good gov-
ernance. 
indeed, effectiveness, efficiency, economy 
and high-quality public services are the prereq-
uisites of good governance. this is emphasised 
in the 2014 report of the oEcD6 and in several 
national-level recommendations and guidelines7. 
in short, objectives and measurable effectiveness 
criteria should be assigned to public spending. it 
must be ensured that each component – from ad-
dressing a problem through planning, decisions 
and implementation to feedback – is carried out 
transparently and checked against measurable 
effectiveness criteria. only this can enable state 
audit institutions to ascertain and control wheth-
er the management of public funds is driven by 
real social needs and public spending indeed 
serves the interests of the public.
objectives and results should be determined 
at multiple levels; therefore, expediency and ef-
fectiveness can be interpreted at several levels. 
this is illustrated by chart 1.
as a first step, governance defines the stra-
tegic objectives to be achieved (e.g. to increase 
the activity rate) on the basis of socio-economic 
needs. strategic objectives are usually defined (as 
policy strategy) in legislation (e.g. employment 
policy strategy). strategic objectives are broken 
down to sub-objectives, which comprise a hier-
archical system (e.g. easing labour market entry 
for inactive workers, including, for example, the 
establishment of a counselling network; increas-
ing the number of new enterprises, including, 
for example, the introduction of tax benefits). 
harmony between the objectives defined at the 
various levels is ensured by the hierarchy of ob-
jectives. relying on the resources available, the 
given process generates an output (e.g. a new tax 
law). the processes serving the achievement of 
the strategic objective end with a certain result 
(e.g. 10% of mothers on maternity leave return to 
the labour market). the impacts arising from the 
implementation of the programme in other areas 
(e.g. negative/positive externalities) must be as-
signed to the results (e.g. number of employees 
crowded out by new labour market entrants). 
in order to gauge the extent to which the 
public funds allocated to the given programme 
6  Partners for good governance: mapping the role of supreme audit institutions (OECD, 2014)
7  E.g. the 2004 publication entitled “The Good Governance Standard for Public Services” by the Independent Commission for Good Governance 
in Public Services, or the publication entitled “Principles for Good Governance and Ethical Practice” by the Independent Sector in the USA; 
Good Governance in Practice, Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ), 2012; International Framework: 
Good Governance in the Public Sector, Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) and the International Federation of 
Accountants® (IFAC®), 2013; Good governance guide for public sector agencies, Government of Western Australia, 2013
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served the implementation of the pre-defined 
objectives, the effectiveness of the programme 
should be examined. While countless questions 
may arise regarding the measurement of effec-
tiveness, it is extremely important to examine 
effectiveness at different levels in any case, de-
pending on the level of the objective to which 
it can be linked. Problems surrounding the ef-
fectiveness should be explored and analysed. on 
the one hand, this is performed by management 
as part of its monitoring duty, while the external 
assessment of performance is carried out by the 
shareholders, the controlling organisation or the 
proprietor, or – as an independent organisation 
– state audit offices by way of objective and pro-
fessionally sound audits.
in democratic and rule of law states, the fi-
nal control of the management of public funds 
and public assets is performed by supreme audit 
institutions (sais), independently of the execu-
tive power. Essentially, sais can contribute to 
good governance in two different ways (oEcD, 
2014). on the one hand, through their existence 
and operation, they reinforce the effectiveness 
of bodies responsible for government oversight 
and for public financial management. Profes-
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figure 1 Multi-level interpretation of effectiveness
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sional and independent sais strengthen the 
accountability chain, which is required to en-
sure that public interest prevails over personal 
interest in decision-making. on the other hand, 
through performance audits, sais assess the ef-
fectiveness, efficiency and economy of imple-
mentation of programmes, providing feedback 
on their performance. the fundamental mandate 
of supreme audit institutions is to strengthen 
public confidence in state institutions, primarily 
with respect to the fair, effective and expedient 
management of public funds and public assets. 
this affects all other areas of citizens’ confi-
dence in their government.
objective and reliable sai assessments play 
an important role in informing decision-makers 
of the government and parliamentary represent-
atives. in this context, sais verify the proper 
use of budgetary resources, the fulfilment of 
public policy objectives, whether the implemen-
tation of the policies complies with legislation 
and the objectives and, in general, whether the 
performance of the government succeeded in 
implementing strategic objectives. upon per-
formance audits however, sais often encoun-
ter the problem that the legislation providing 
the regulatory framework of public spending 
fails to provide the objectives to be achieved 
and the criteria against which objectives can be 
deemed achieved. this poses severe problems 
in the evaluation of individual public projects 
as, in the absence of objectives and criteria, the 
objective of the government intervention must 
be presumed and indicators for its measurement 
must be defined subsequently. the selection of 
objectives and indicators is a key factor. indeed, 
the definition of which indicators must be met in 
order to reach a certain goal may determine the 
outcome of the assessment as a whole – some in-
dicators could be relevant to certain goals, while 
others could be irrelevant. in addition, the selec-
tion of the indicators is limited by the quantity 
and quality of the data available. Policy-makers 
can support and limit the evaluation of the use 
of public funds to a clear framework if they de-
termine the objectives of government interven-
tions in advance, allocate measurable indicators 
to them, and ensure the regular collection and 
processing of data required for the calculation 
of the indicators.
2.2 Regulatory environment 
pertaining to the expediency 
and effectiveness of public 
spending in Hungary 
below we provide a brief overview of the regulatory environment that defines the ex-
pediency, effectiveness and efficiency require-
ments of public spending. 
it is a reasonable expectation of public 
spending that it should generate social benefits8 
(increase public good); therefore, the objective 
of public spending should always be measurable 
against a social utility target value. at the macro 
level, the objectives of the use of public funds 
are fundamentally determined by regulations 
and regulatory instruments under public law. 
the basic principles of the strategic gov-
ernance of the government are laid down in 
a government decree9. the Decree supports 
the government’s goal to ensure that strategic 
thinking becomes a fundamental element of 
organisational operation, and that the organisa-
tion becomes capable of concerted, high-qual-
ity strategic planning, identifying its short and 
medium-term objectives, defining the tasks and 
assigning responsibilities, as well as monitoring 
and assessing the implementation of the tasks 
8    Social utility means the benefits reaped by society as a whole. It consists of direct and indirect components, and considers environmental impacts 
and, for example, the effects on job creation. It is a broader category than financial utility. It is primarily used for cost-benefit analyses prepared 
for development projects financed from EU funds.
9    Government Decree No. 38/2012 (III. 12.) on Strategic Governance
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and the pre-determined objectives. the legisla-
tion defines the hierarchy of strategy papers10, 
the persons responsible for drawing up the doc-
uments, the principles of follow-up, evaluation 
and review, and rules pertaining to individual 
document types. 
sometimes, however, even the legislation 
fails to define the regulatory objective, which 
renders the interpretation of the expediency of 
public spending difficult or impossible. hun-
garian regulations do not include a requirement 
for the definition, application and monitoring 
of effectiveness, efficiency, economy or other 
performance indicators pertaining to the entire 
group of public fund users. by contrast, the 
legislation defines in detail the amount and the 
main allocations of the public funds available 
(prevailing act on the budget and the budget 
decree pertaining to local governments) and the 
criteria for the use of public funds by budget-
ary institutions. they state that the economy, ef-
ficiency and effectiveness of the use of public 
funds and public assets must be ensured; how-
ever, the meaning of these concepts is unclear. 
besides legislation or in-house regulations, 
the performance criteria of the given organisa-
tion can be enforced by other means; for exam-
ple, by the expectations of the controlling body, 
the proprietor or the shareholder. this includes 
the public service contract concluded by the 
state and the public service provider, which is 
a written contract for the performance of a pub-
lic function or a part thereof on behalf of the 
organisation11. in addition to the basic require-
ments of the performance of public services, the 
contract also stipulates quality requirements and 
conditions12. 
obviously, the existence of the regulation 
cannot ensure effective and efficient operation 
in itself; it only provides a framework for it. the 
head of the organisation is responsible for filling 
these frameworks with substance.
the greatest deficiency of the regulation, 
therefore, is the fact that it fails to enforce the 
declaration of the objectives, expected results 
and performance criteria of public spending at 
the systemic level; consequently, it is impossi-
ble to measure the effectiveness and efficiency 
of public spending subsequently. as has been 
confirmed by the findings of the state audit of-
fice, the deficiencies suggest that the social util-
ity of public spending falls short of the level that 
could have been achieved by a clear definition 
of the objective and by result-oriented opera-
tion. recognising this problem, regulatory proc-
esses commenced in relation to a segment of the 
economic agents managing public funds: public 
administration organisations. these processes 
shift the system of public spending specifically 
toward strategic control and result-oriented op-
eration. (apart from this, there are a number of 
other policy programmes and strategies of the 
government where regulations have commenced; 
they, however, are not targeted at ensuring the 
effectiveness and efficiency of public spending 
or demanding follow-up and evaluation). 
10  strategic planning documents: country forecast, national medium-term strategy, ministerial programme, institutional work plan (i.e. mandatory 
documents), as well as the long-term concept, the white book, policy strategy, policy programme, institutional strategy and green book (optional)
11    Pursuant to Act CLXXV of 2011 on the Freedom of Association, on Public-Benefit Status, and on the Activities of and Support for Civil Society 
Organisations (Act on CSOs).
12    As prescribed, for example, by Act XLI of 2012 on Passenger Transport Services or Government Decree No. 317/2013 (VIII. 28.) on the Selection 
of Municipal Waste Management Service Providers and on the Contract on the Municipal Waste Management Service.
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3. findingS 
Of SaO auDItS 
the audits of the state audit office measure different aspects of performance to ensure 
that public funds are managed in an orderly, 
growth-stimulating fashion. the methodology 
of the sao’s performance audits are based on 
the iNtosai standards (issai 100 and issai 
300). “Performance auditing promotes the trans-
parent operation of organisations by providing, 
based on the audit evidence, an independent and 
authentic perspective, by issuing conclusions 
for the targeted users of the audit results, and 
by offering an insight into the implementation 
and outcomes of audited activities related to 
the management of public funds and public as-
sets. accordingly, it provides useful information 
while serving as a basis for the acquisition of 
knowledge and performance improvement. Per-
formance audits support the responsible parties 
in the improvement of accountability by offer-
ing new evaluation criteria.” (SAO, 2015)
in addition, the sao’s compliance audits 
and results of the integrity survey13 also identi-
fied effectivity problems. these experiences can 
be used in the planning process of performance 
audits, too.
3.1 audit findings of 
SaO’s performance audits 
the performance audits of the sao shed light on a number of problems that derived 
from inadequate indicators or backtesting, or the 
inadequate definition of objectives. Németh and 
Kolozsi (2015) processed the audit findings, and 
the possible problems arising during the audits 
were found to be the following (the number in 
brackets indicates the number of the relevant au-
dit report):
a)  objectives have not been set or proved 
to be deficient (e.g. the reorganisation of 
psychiatric health care, No. 1286);
b)  objectives have been set but the system of 
indicators and criteria designed to meas-
ure the successful implementation of the 
objectives is either missing or inadequate 
(subsidy scheme of public employment, 
No. 13097).
c)  objectives have been set, an indicator 
system has been designed and a set of 
criteria has been developed and applied; 
however, there is no follow-up and the 
reasons for deviations are not analysed 
(implementation of rural development 
objectives, No. 1293).
d)  there are simultaneous deficiencies at 
multiple levels with respect to the defi-
nition of objectives, the performance 
criteria, as well as backtesting (financial 
management of business associations in 
majority state/local government owner-
ship).
reorganisation of psychiatric care: conse-
quences of the lack of efficiency objectives
in 2012, the state audit office conducted 
a performance audit with regard to the reor-
ganisation of psychiatric care. the purpose of 
sao’s first-time audit of psychiatric care was to 
evaluate whether the resources being spent on 
reorganising psychiatric care were appropriately 
utilised and whether the reorganisation led to a 
more cost-effective, higher-quality and more 
evenly accessible service. the audit covered the 
period between 1 January 2006 and 30 septem-
ber 2011.
the audit found that goals had not been set at 
the macro level neither in terms of the effective-
13  The goal of the series of surveys performed annually by the SAO since 2011 has been to identify the risks which may adversely influence the integ-
rity of the given organisations within public sector institutions. In addition to identifying the risks, the survey also maps out the coverage levels of 
controls serving to manage these risks. In addition to the fight against corruption, expanding the circle of institutions that accept and endorse the 
integrity-based mentality is another high priority of the integrity surveys. The ultimate goal is to promote cultural change and to create integrity-
based institutional operation and to spread thinking in terms of risks in the Hungarian public sector.
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ness nor in terms of the efficiency of psychiatric 
care (neither in the professional or public health, 
nor in the financial areas); the relevant indica-
tors had not been designed, and therefore, it was 
not possible to monitor and backtest the effects 
of the reorganisation. 
Due to the grave deficiencies of planning, se-
vere problems emerged in the already distressed 
health care system. for example, closing down 
the National institute of Psychiatry and Neurol-
ogy eliminated the national institution for psy-
chiatric care that was meant to provide a com-
prehensive framework for the individual types 
of psychiatric care; the institutions designated 
to take over the tasks were unprepared, and a 
substantial amount of financial liabilities accu-
mulated.
the audit found that even though several 
government initiatives had been announced for 
the reorganisation of healthcare in the period of 
2006–2011, they did not specifically determine 
the tasks and size of psychiatric care. hospital 
restructuring in 2007 terminated inpatient psy-
chiatric care in 11 hospitals, curbed the number 
of total active beds in psychiatry by 20% na-
tionwide, and closed down the National insti-
tute of Psychiatry and Neurology – which was 
considered to be the apex of the mental health 
profession – without any surveys with respect to 
the regional distribution of psychiatric diseases 
or to the expected impact of the decisions. in 
addition, there was no consultation with profes-
sional organisations or patient advocacy groups, 
and the health care system was unprepared for 
the dramatic change entailed by the reorganisa-
tion. although the goal of the reorganisation – 
including the termination of the national institu-
tion – was to streamline the care system, the lack 
of adequate professional planning deteriorated 
the conditions of psychiatric care. bed cuts in 
inpatient psychiatric care as part of hospital re-
structuring did not address earlier capacity im-
balances, nor were there any legal provisions 
on adjusting capacities in specialist outpatient 
care. the elimination of the National institute 
of Psychiatry and Neurology – a top quality 
professional institution – was an unreasonable 
decision; decision-makers failed to survey the 
financial implications of the institution’s elimi-
nation in advance; the institutions designated to 
take over the tasks were unprepared. the target 
date for the institution’s liquidation, therefore, 
was delayed by a year.
starting from 2008, the ministry of health 
and hungarian psychiatric professional organi-
sations commenced the development of a crite-
ria system suitable for measuring performance; 
however, the evaluation of cost efficiency and 
effectiveness did not have an established and 
applied methodology at the time; therefore, the 
state audit office developed its own indicators 
suitable for performance assessment during the 
audit. through the analysis of these indicators, 
the sao found that the cost-efficiency and ef-
fectiveness of public spending on psychiatric 
care deteriorated in comparison to 2006. the 
primary reasons behind this deterioration were 
capacity imbalances in psychiatric care; in the 
absence of disease registers, health care and so-
cial care capacities were not based on morbid-
ity data. there was no organised care regulating 
services for patients, and regional access was 
unevenly distributed. moreover, in the absence 
of accurate disease registers, no information was 
available on the actual prevalence of psychiatric 
disorders by region.
14  Az egyesülési jogról, a közhasznú jogállásról, valamint a civil szervezetek működéséről és támogatásáról szóló 2011. évi CLXXV. törvény (Civil tv.) 
alapján.
15  Mint ahogyan ezt pl. a személyszállítási szolgáltatásokról szóló 2012. évi XLI. törvény, vagy a közszolgáltató kiválasztásáról és a hulladékgazdál-
kodási közszolgáltatási szerződésről szóló 317/2013. (VIII. 28.) Korm. rendelet is előírja.
16  A Magyary Program hatékonyság fogalma magában foglalja az alábbi fogalmakat is: eredményes, gazdaságos, hatásos, biztonságos, felügyelhető, 
alkalmazkodó.
17  Common Assessment Framework – CAF: egy teljes körű minőségirányítási eszköz, amelyet a közszféra képviselői dolgoztak ki a közszféra számára 
az Európai Minőségirányítási Alapítvány Kiválóság Modelljét alapul véve
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reorganisation has failed to lead to a more 
even distribution of hospital capacities or create 
a more sustainable care system better geared to 
treatment needs. 
in summary: the centrally executed reorgani-
sation of the institutional system did not have a 
pre-determined hierarchy of objectives and the 
expected results were not defined; therefore, 
it was not possible to assess the objectives of 
the public funds spent on the project or identify 
the social utility of the reorganisation. in such 
situations, there is a threat that objectives are set 
randomly, reflecting prevailing interests rather 
than being defined as a result of a thorough and 
concerted planning process with maximum con-
sideration to social utility. in the absence of a 
hierarchy of objectives, it is impossible to meas-
ure the expediency, effectiveness and efficiency 
of the programme as a whole, which calls into 
question the expediency, effectiveness and effi-
ciency of public spending. 
3.1.2 Public employment, consequences 
of the lack of an appropriate indicator 
system and criteria 
as it became apparent, the establishment of 
a hierarchy of objectives is indispensable for ex-
pedient, effective and efficient operations. the 
example presented below illustrates the possi-
ble implications of deficiencies in the indicators 
designed to measure the achievement of goals, 
the relevant criteria, and the information system 
supporting their measurement. 
in september 2013, the state audit office 
published its report No. 13097 on the perform-
ance audit on the efficiency and effectiveness of 
the subsidy scheme of public employment and 
the related training programmes. the objective 
of the audit was to assess whether the public 
employment system being in place in the period 
between 2009 and 2012 Q1 – including the re-
lated subsidy scheme and training system and 
the changes introduced –, as well as the coop-
eration between local governments and labour 
organisations efficiently and effectively assisted 
in increasing the participation of the long-term 
unemployed with low-level academic qualifica-
tions who are capable of work through public 
employment or training schemes, in facilitating 
their return to the open labour market and in im-
proving their labour market position.
the audit found that the strategic objectives 
regarding public employment in the review pe-
riod had been set (in several, interdependent 
documents), and from 2011, specific goals and 
tasks were defined in relation to the strategies. 
however, they did not – or insufficiently – set 
the effectiveness and efficiency indicators and 
criteria that are suitable for confirming the im-
plementation of the objectives and allow for 
continuous monitoring and ex-post evaluations. 
the entire infrastructure of the measurement 
was missing, or deficient as well. Due to the 
lack of a comparable indicator system measur-
ing the effectiveness and efficiency of the public 
employment system in place, there was no cen-
tral evaluation. 
therefore, wherever the quality and quantity 
of the data available allowed, the state audit 
office derived its own indicators from the pre-
determined objectives, and drew its conclusions 
on the basis of the analysis of these indicators. 
as a result, the sao found that the number of 
persons involved in public employment doubled 
from 2009 to 2011, which means that the public 
employment system was effective in supporting 
the increased involvement of the unemployed 
in public employment, and in accomplishing 
the strategic objectives concerning subsidised 
employment. Public employment had a posi-
tive effect on both the employment rate and the 
unemployment rate (improving the employment 
rate by 0.8–1.1% and the unemployment rate 
by 1.4–2.0%). in addition, the subsidy scheme 
efficiently contributed to involving those of ac-
18  A Magyary Program célkitűzései alapján került elfogadásra a jogalkotásról szóló 2010. évi CXXX. törvény hatásvizsgálatokra vonatkozó része, 
valamint az előzetes és utólagos hatásvizsgálatról szóló 24/2011. (VIII. 9.) KIM-rendelet.
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tive age and receiving social benefits in employ-
ment. these goals were, at the same time, also 
employment policy objectives.
based on the audit findings, the sao issued 
a recommendation for developing a criteria and 
indicator system suitable for measuring the per-
formance of public employment, and for setting 
up a monitoring system with a view to monitor-
ing the implementation of the pre-determined 
objectives.
another problem explored by the audit was 
the fact that, owing to deficiencies in the conti-
nuity, timeliness and reliability of registries and 
disclosures, the information system of public 
employment did not support regular reporting 
and feedback to policy-makers in the review pe-
riod; in some areas the quantity or quality of the 
data available was insufficient for the monitoring 
process. for example, they did not collect data 
systematically with respect to the exits of public 
workers from the open labour market – which 
would have been required for comprehensive 
government analyses –, and no comparable data 
was available with respect to the entry of public 
workers into the open labour market (neither at 
the central nor at the local levels). consequently, 
it was impossible to assess the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the efforts to facilitate the return of 
public workers to the open labour market. With 
that in mind, the sao recommended the devel-
opment of a data reporting system that provides 
reliable data for the evaluation of the implemen-
tation of public employment objectives. 
in this case, it is not possible to decide 
whether the objectives were implemented ef-
fectively and efficiently, because, in the absence 
of pre-determined indicators and criteria it re-
mains unclear which outcome would have been 
considered effective and efficient by those who 
set the objectives. in any event, the sao found 
that the use of public funds contributed to the 
reduction of the unemployment rate and the 
improvement in the employment rate through a 
sharp increase in the number of public workers, 
and that the efficiency of the public employment 
subsidy system improved by 2011 from the as-
pect of the central budget (i.e. the per capita 
subsidy amount declined with a simultaneous 
increase in the number of public workers). in 
other words, the results achieved by the use of 
public funds contributed to the implementation 
of the pre-determined objectives.
3.1.3 Implementation of rural 
development objectives; consequences of 
deviation from the objectives 
sometimes, even though strategic objectives 
are defined, the related, multi-level sub-objectives 
are set and the adequate indicators and criteria 
are put in place; during implementation the pro-
gramme is modified (e.g. in terms of funding, 
the criteria system or target groups) on the basis 
of priorities that are not in line with the original 
objectives; and consequently, its effectiveness and 
efficiency fail to achieve the pre-determined level. 
in august 2012, the sao published its report 
on the performance audit on the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the utilisation of funds used for the 
implementation of rural development objectives 
and the strengthening of the role of local com-
munities and its role in the improvement of the 
quality of life in rural areas. the main purpose 
of the audit was to assess whether the utilisation 
of funds allocated to the implementation of rural 
development objectives – to improve the quality 
of life in rural areas, to encourage diversification 
of the rural economy and to strengthen the role of 
local communities – was effective and efficient in 
the period of 2007–2011.
the audit found that the objectives of the 
New hungary rural Development Programme 
(NhrDP) were in line both with the objectives 
of the National Development Policy concept and 
with Eu requirements. output, result and impact 
indicators had been defined to measure the im-
19 „A jó állam mérhetősége”, Jó Állam Kutatóműhely, NKE 2014
20 A 2015. évi jelentést lásd a http://ati.uni-nke.hu/uploads/media_items/jo-allam-jelentes.original.pdf link alatt.
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plementation of the targets and the impacts (e.g. 
number of villages and micro-enterprises sup-
ported, number of new jobs, total amount invest-
ed, and net number of new jobs created as a result 
of development). 
however, problems arose during the imple-
mentation of the programme as a result of the 
low number of completed projects, the commit-
ments undertaken in relation to the funding and 
the limited rate of payments. the programme 
was modified several times, but the substance of 
rural development objectives remained the same. 
thus, for example, there was a shift in the alloca-
tions between the measures aimed at improving 
the quality of life in rural areas and encouraging 
the diversification of the rural economy: more 
than a half of the funds allocated to the measure 
aimed at the creation and development of micro-
enterprises was reallocated to the measure target-
ing the improvement of the image and attractive-
ness of rural life and the quality of services. this 
modification was contrary to the objective set 
out in the NhrDP’s economic development pro-
gramme intended to strengthen micro-enterprises 
operating in rural settlements and to improve 
local employment. increasing the resources for 
improving the image and attractiveness of rural 
settlements and the quality of services rendered 
did not contribute to managing the social ten-
sions generated by the restrained economic activ-
ity of the population living in rural areas, by the 
low employment rates and hence, by the limited 
amount of income. 
the reorganisation of resources was not ac-
companied by an overall review of indicators 
intended to measure the implementation of the 
objectives (e.g. number of micro-enterprises sup-
ported, total amount invested, number of multi-
functional service centres, etc.). the indicators 
were modified only in part; without underlying 
calculations and impact assessments. 
the monitoring committee tasked with the 
follow-up of the programme monitored and eval-
uated the achieved results on a continuous basis. 
however, the efficiency of the function – which 
was designed to supervise the quality of execu-
tion partly independently of the executive organi-
sations – was low. 
in summary, although the objectives and the 
related effectiveness indicators were defined at 
the start of the project, during subsequent modi-
fications of the programme – justified by rea-
sons irrespective of the project – the indicators 
intended to measure the results and the resources 
ensuring that such indicators are achieved were 
not changed in a complex and coordinated man-
ner, and the results, performance and impacts 
expected from the support system received less 
attention. consequently, the originally defined 
regional development and convergence objec-
tives were implemented only in part and there-
fore, the expediency, effectiveness and efficiency 
of public spending fell short of the originally de-
sired levels.
3.2 audit findings pertaining 
to business associations in 
majority state ownership 
the sao reports prepared on the macro-eco-nomic correlations of fiscal processes (the 
latest one of which was issued in september 
2015) pointed out that the ratio of public spend-
ing on economic functions to GDP had increased 
continuously since 2011. the increase in expen-
ditures allocated to economic functions prima-
rily reflects the high absorption of Eu grants 
and state acquisitions. this trend reflects the 
increasing economic participation of the state, 
which, according to Domokos (2015) opens up 
new opportunities on the one hand (e.g. increas-
ing national wealth, development of depleted 
but unreplaced assets, increasing economic 
strength of the state), but also carries a certain 
21  Azon szervezeteknél, amelyek már bekapcsolódtak az önkéntes integritási kérdőív kitöltésébe, ott az adatszolgáltatás minőségét értékelte az ÁSZ. 
Egyéb szervezeteknél ellenőrzési tanúsítványok kitöltésére került sor integritás témakörben.
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degree of risk. for instance, the need to ensure 
the funding required for a more active partici-
pation in economic functions entails the reallo-
cation or withdrawal of resources, which may 
pose funding risks over several time horizons in 
other areas (e.g. among those receiving reduced 
budgetary subsidies or subject to special taxes, 
as well as in areas receiving a smaller propor-
tion of Eu transfers). in addition, a competition 
for the acquisition of public funds materialises 
between traditional state functions and the eco-
nomic functions of the state.
the fact that the state is at the same time a 
legislator, shareholder and supervisor in an in-
creasing number of economic areas may also 
be a risk factor. being responsible for all three 
functions simultaneously gives rise to a conflict 
of interest between, for example, the legislator 
and the shareholder (the creation of a regulatory 
environment encouraging competition vs. the 
crowding-out of competitors and monopolistic 
endeavours). the change in ownership implies 
that, through its business associations, the state 
now operates in markets where its presence was 
previously limited to a regulatory role. accord-
ingly, there is a risk that the level of expertise 
required for the management of a state-owned 
company competing under market conditions 
is insufficient, and thus the operation of the or-
ganisation is ineffective or inefficient. this in-
creases the risk of losses and wasteful operation. 
these risks may be mitigated by an adequate 
regulatory environment and by the exercising 
of ownership rights (e.g. shareholder’s control), 
and by facilitating transparent and performance-
oriented operations.
in consideration of the risks involved, the 
auditing of the financial management of busi-
ness associations in majority state/local govern-
ment ownership has become a relatively new 
but increasingly important area of sao audits 
(e.g. transportation companies, district heating 
providers, waste management companies, water 
and public utility companies, theatres). the au-
dit findings contribute to improving the relevant 
regulations, as well as state-owned company 
management and processes for exercising own-
ership rights and ultimately, to improving the 
state’s performance.
the sao performs the assessment of busi-
ness associations in the context of compliance 
audits. Propriety audits are performed where 
certain issues cannot be judged on the basis of 
legal provisions or where there are clear defi-
ciencies in legislation. Performance audits are 
intended to establish whether the stewardship of 
public funds and public assets complies with the 
principles of effectiveness, efficiency and econ-
omy, and whether there is room for improve-
ment. typically, however, there are no effective-
ness requirements in place (set by the exercisers 
of ownership rights, the bodies of the company 
or its management) to determine the objective to 
be achieved and the desired impact; therefore, in 
most cases the accountability of public spend-
ing is limited to its regularity and propriety. 
sao audits are primarily intended to verify and 
evaluate financial standing, asset management, 
the existence of internal control systems and the 
regularity of the areas constituting an integral 
part of these items. at the same time, audit find-
ings allow us to identify critical areas that may 
not be separated from the scope of responsibility 
of management and the exercisers of ownership 
or oversight rights.
sao audits pointed out that deficiencies 
in the management of state-owned companies 
generate losses in numerous areas, including 
financial and non-financial losses (e.g. loss of 
confidence, moral hazards). these losses stem 
from various sources and could reflect deficien-
cies in the exercising of ownership rights and 
management-related problems. the materiali-
sation of deficiencies at multiple control levels 
may amplify one another, leading to significant 
economic, effectiveness or efficiency losses.14
14  The last study of the Study Series identifies the key factors of well-managed state-owned enterprises, summarizes the results of SAO’s audits and 
proposes detailed recommendations for ownership entities, supervisory boards and management of state-owned companies.
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3.2.1 Deficiencies arising in the 
exercising of ownership rights
appropriate exercise of ownership rights, 
tight ownership control and the definition of the 
direction of public asset management are indis-
pensable factors in responsible public spending 
and asset management. audit findings point to 
a lack or ambiguity of directives regarding the 
use of public funds and public assets (e.g. the 
National asset management Directives defin-
ing the strategic and annual frameworks for the 
responsible management of state property, or 
the annual National asset management Pro-
gramme have not been completed). moreover, 
the exercise of ownership or oversight does not 
fulfil its intended role in several areas (defini-
tion of performance criteria, reporting system, 
ownership control, evaluation). audits and 
analyses on areas playing a key role in terms of 
competitiveness (acquisition and utilisation of 
knowledge, investment projects, inexpensive 
energy, employment, market organisation, sus-
tainable development) found evidence for the 
absence of targeted indicators (indices) suit-
able for measuring results, direct and indirect 
benefits, and pointed out – in the case of the 
use of domestic funds – the lack (or deficien-
cies) of monitoring systems ensuring reliable 
and up-to-date data reporting and feedback. 
the sao has drawn attention to these prob-
lems on several occasions, and identified the 
risks entailed.
ownership control is a particularly impor-
tant item of ownership rights which, in the case 
of local governments, is typically manifested in 
the activity of the supervisory board. the pri-
mary asset manager (hungarian state holding 
company) monitored the activity of the com-
panies primarily on the basis of controls rely-
ing on requested data disclosures. however, it 
failed to perform on-site inspections regarding 
the financial management, preservation, accu-
mulation and use of public assets. the compa-
nies’ disclosures were insufficient, and prob-
lems were detected with respect to the owners’ 
reporting systems as well (non-compliance 
with regulations, failure to provide the required 
information, failure to demand reports), which 
impaired the enforcement of transparency.
the supervisory boards discussed and ap-
proved the annual business plans and the an-
nual reports; however, they usually did not in-
spect – for the protection of the owner’s assets 
and public interest – changes in wealth, the 
financial management of company assets and 
stewardship of the state property entrusted to 
the company.
in order to ensure the accomplishment of 
the objectives, clear effectiveness requirements 
must be defined for management on the one 
hand and, on the other, the fulfilment of these 
performance criteria needs to be monitored 
and evaluated on a continuous basis. in case of 
deviations, the owner must take the necessary 
measures. Evidence shows that the perform-
ance assessment system of corporate managers 
is not consistent, and it lacks a related, efficient 
incentive system. 
as regards ownership control, in addition to 
its recommendations based on the audit find-
ings, the sao also issued letters of warning, 
advising the exercisers of ownership rights – 
among other things – to review the financial 
management of the business association and in 
this context, to define expectations regarding 
the content of business plans and reports, and 
to review and manage the accounts receivable 
of the business association. the sao also ad-
vised the owner to define – in the context of ex-
ercising its ownership rights – a set of criteria 
to measure, for example, the efficiency of pub-
lic service functions or professional standards 
for evaluating service levels for the company.
3.2.2 management of state-owned 
companies
the audits found that, in many cases, the 
financial management of the companies did 
not comply with statutory requirements (e.g. 
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important accounting policies were missing, 
prime cost calculations were unfounded or 
missing, the requirements of accounting sepa-
ration were violated). severe regularity and 
financial management problems went undetec-
ted in many cases; neither management, nor the 
exerciser of ownership rights took measures to 
reduce the risks arising from these problems, 
and the supervisory boards failed to raise at-
tention to the risks jeopardising the implemen-
tation of the objectives.
for the most part, business plans did not 
include criteria pertaining to the effectiveness, 
economy and efficiency of financial manage-
ment and professional performance. in the ab-
sence of pre-determined criteria, the perform-
ance of the company’s management cannot be 
measured, and the loss-producing or profit-gen-
erating areas cannot be identified. in numerous 
cases, the plans did not include detailed infor-
mation about the scheduled projects; therefore, 
it is impossible to make informed decisions 
about the allocation of public funds or about 
investment projects. 
the sao found that, in many cases, the in-
ternal regulations pertaining to prime cost cal-
culation did not adhere to legal regulations in 
the case of companies providing public serv-
ices. this issue is not only important from the 
perspective of compliance with the act on ac-
counting; indeed, another important function of 
prime cost calculation – in the economic sense 
– is to support the decision-making process. in 
the case of business associations performing 
public functions and providing public services, 
there are numerous areas where it is impossi-
ble to make well-founded and forward-looking 
decisions in the absence of adequate prime cost 
calculations. these areas typically include the 
execution of planning tasks, price formation, 
cost analysis, calculations providing the foun-
dation for economic decisions, indicators de-
signed to measure internal performance. these 
areas are also within the management’s scope 
of responsibility and, through the approval of 
the business plans, they are of decisive impor-
tance from the perspective of the supervisory 
exerciser of ownership rights.
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4. cOncluSIOnS
in several cases, the audits conducted by the state audit office of hungary shed a light 
on general problems that may give rise to risks 
jeopardising the achievement of policy or so-
cial objectives. the audit findings of the sao 
confirm that the control systems of both public 
entities and state-owned business associations 
need to be improved significantly in order to 
ensure good governance and public sector man-
agement. this calls for a paradigm shift; new 
horizons should be opened up in the public sec-
tor management approach. it is indispensable to 
ensure the transparency, publicity and measur-
ability of public sector management’s perform-
ance, because this is the only way to ensure ef-
fective, efficient, cost-effective and sustainable 
public management and to increase social well-
being. 
first, the regulatory environment should be 
improved to identify objectives, to specify the 
expected performance and to develop the in-
dicator system related to public spending. the 
owner needs to define the criteria for the imple-
mentation of objectives and sub-objectives in 
a manner that ensures the objective execution 
of performance assessment and control. at the 
same time, objectivity requires reliable data-
bases, which are currently not available in the 
whole sector. 
Parallel to this, it is also essential to improve 
the regulations pertaining to management along 
the lines of new aspects. the ethical require-
ments set for public managers should be tight-
ened to properly reflect the fact that they act 
on behalf of the community, bearing responsi-
bility for public property and for safeguarding 
the future of the community. Public confidence 
in management must be earned and retained. 
Good managers act as an example for all and 
do everything in their power to ensure that the 
organisation entrusted to them fulfils the public 
purpose for which it was established. 
the state audit office, as a supreme audit 
institution, plays a prominent role in the renewal 
of public management. its performance audits 
are designed to evaluate the use of public funds 
focusing on expediency and effectiveness, en-
forcing its transparency and the measurability 
of performance. the execution of performance 
audits, however, is often impaired by the lack 
of the required indicator system. therefore, in 
recent years the sao has supported – and will 
continue to support – the enforcement of the ex-
pediency/effectiveness/efficiency requirement 
in the planning, implementation and evaluation 
of government objectives through the publica-
tion of a series of performance-oriented studies. 
in its advisory role, the sao has often called 
the legislator’s attention to problems surround-
ing the effectiveness and efficiency based assess-
ment of public spending, and issued a number of 
recommendations. some of the proposals per-
tained to the selection, performance assessment 
and remuneration of management. the proposal 
package included the following recommenda-
tions: 
 the performance of the management of 
state-owned companies should be evaluated 
from the perspective of compliance, effec-
tiveness, efficiency and economy on a con-
tinuous basis; 
 the ability and activity of the exerciser 
of ownership rights to evaluate effectiveness 
should be strengthened; 
 managers of state-owned companies 
should comply with strict ethical and integ-
rity principles; and
 the remuneration system of company 
managers should be reformed.
the sao wishes to continue to play a lead-
ing role in the creation of a knowledge base in 
order to enable economic actors responsible 
for the management of public funds, as well as 
those controlling and supervising the process, to 
safeguard public funds and public assets in an 
ethical and highly professional manner. 
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